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INTRODUCTION
For Richard Rude, prison provided the structure and guidance he
needed to transform his life.1 When Richard first arrived, he re-
ceived an infraction for heroin possession.2 But eventually, Richard,
a previously nonreligious individual, began attending church;3 he
became actively involved in the prison’s ministry, serving as an
assistant group director and later a group leader.4 Richard was
serving a sixteen-year-and-two-month sentence for sexual assault.5
While incarcerated, Richard underwent sex offender treatment,
attending two-hour group sessions four times a week and individ-
ual sessions twice a month.6 His provider reported that Richard
“made significant progress.”7 Richard acknowledged the causes of
his behavior and addressed his previously misguided beliefs.8 He
expressed regret for his past behavior and the pain he caused to his
victim.9 Additionally, while incarcerated, Richard reconnected with
his daughter, married a fellow ministry volunteer, and regained his
sobriety.10
However, days before Richard’s scheduled release from prison, the
government petitioned to place him into civil commitment.11 A jury
found Richard to be a “sexually violent predator,”12 and he was
committed to the McNeil Island Special Commitment Center for
1. See generally Brief of Petitioner at 4-9, In re Rude, 2014 WL 295772 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014) (No. 69061-2-1).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See In re Rude, 2014 WL 295772, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2014).
6. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 7.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Id. at 8-9.
10. Id. at 8.
11. See Lynsi Burton, MV Man to Be Kept in Prison Indefinitely for Sex Offenses,
GOSKAGIT (June 23, 2012), https://www.goskagit.com/news/local_news/mn-man-to-be-kept-in-
prison-indefinitely-for-sex/article_27fb3b93-cb57-504c-a761-34a31498d188.html [https://
perma.cc/R2R6-2482].
12. In re Rude, 2014 WL 295772, at *3.
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life.13 As of 2014, Richard was still committed,14 and in all likelihood
he will remain in the facility for the rest of his life.15 Although
Richard’s clinicians and family believe that he deserves a second
chance, the state denied his petition for release.16
Twenty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal govern-
ment have enacted Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) laws that
permit the civil commitment of sex offenders.17 Under these laws,
imprisoned sex offenders serving criminal sentences are transferr-
ed to treatment facilities and held indefinitely.18 As one individual
describes civil commitment, “It’s worse than prison. In prison I
wasn’t happy, but I was content because I knew I had a release
date.”19 An estimated 5,400 individuals are currently civilly
committed under these laws.20
The cost to confine an individual under civil commitment
programs is not insignificant. For example, the State of Washington
pays over $185,000 per year to confine a single individual.21 While
the applicable statutes vary from state to state, four elements are
generally required for commitment: (1) a past sexual offense, (2) the
presence of a mental disorder or abnormality, (3) an inability to
control one’s sexual behavior, and (4) a risk of recidivism.22 This
13. See Burton, supra note 11.
14. See Respondent’s Opening Brief at 1-2, In re Rude, No. 71460-1 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept.
14, 2014).
15. See Burton, supra note 11.
16. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 1, at 8-9, 12; In re Rude, 2014 WL 295772, at *1.
17. Civil Commitment, ASS’N FOR THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, https://www.atsa.
com/civil-commitment-2 [https://perma.cc/TJ3X-JFH7].
18. See James Ridgeway, How ‘Civil Commitment’ Enables Indefinite Detention of Sex
Offenders, GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/sep/26/civil-commitment-sex-offenders [https://perma.cc/X9LG-ZNZP]. 
19. Leon Neyfakh, “It’s Worse than Prison,” SLATE (Oct. 9, 2015, 10:52 AM), https://slate.
com/news-and-politics/2015/10/civil-commitment-laws-allow-authorities-to-keep-people-
locked-up-indefinitely.html [https://perma.cc/ADS7-4222].
20. George Steptoe & Antoine Goldet, Why Some Young Sex Offenders Are Held
Indefinitely, MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2016/01/27/why-some-young-sex-offenders-are-held-indefinitely [https://perma.cc/XCF2-
C37C].
21. See Emily Gillespie, On Washington’s McNeil Island, the Only Residents Are 214
Dangerous Sex Offenders, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/oct/03/dangerous-sex-offenders-mcneil-island-commitment-center [https://perma.cc/
BW65-D2SF].
22. Holly A. Miller, Amy E. Amenta & Mary Alice Conroy, Sexually Violent Predator
Evaluations: Empirical Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29
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Note argues that such laws do not adequately protect respondents’
due process rights. To that end, this Note proposes a more rights-
protective application of Mathews to expand procedural protections
for respondents in SVP civil commitment proceedings and offers two
additional procedures to better protect respondents’ rights.
Part I begins by detailing the history and enactment of SVP laws
across the United States and the subsequent constitutional
challenges to such laws. Part II discusses the current process for
civil commitment and the rights respondents receive at trial. Part
III points to recent empirical findings that illustrate a lack of
procedural protections present in these trials. Part IV explores the
use of the Mathews test when determining the adequacy of proce-
dural due process and analyzes state appellate courts’ use of the
Mathews test when expanding procedural protections for respon-
dents. Part V proposes an application of Mathews that more
robustly protects procedural due process in SVP civil commitment
proceedings and offers two additional procedures for states to
consider.
I. HISTORY OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR STATUTES
In the 1930s, states began enacting sexual psychopath laws to
identify sexual offenders in need of rehabilitation and treatment.23
However, states rarely utilized these laws for the first fifty years.24
In 1990, the State of Washington passed the Community Protection
Act25 in response to public outrage over violent crimes committed by
sexual recidivists.26 Around the same time, some released sex of-
fenders in Minnesota committed similarly heinous rape-murders.27
As a result, Washington and Minnesota were the first states to
implement civil commitment laws to prevent recurring sexual
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 31 (2005).
23. Samuel Jan Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal
and Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 71
(2000). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these statutes, which provided for
the separate treatment of sex offenders, in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270, 277 (1940).
24. See Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 23, at 72-74.
25. Community Protection Act, ch. 3, 1990 Wash. Sess. Laws 12. 
26. See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT 14-15 (2006).
27. See id. at 15.
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offenses.28 Proponents continue to defend SVP civil commitment
laws as a means of ensuring public safety by confining sexual
predators.29 Because SVP civil commitment laws significantly
deprive an individual of his or her liberty, the constitutionality of
these laws has been litigated extensively.30
A. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill
Civil commitment laws for the mentally ill existed prior to the
enactment of SVP laws.31 In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the United
States Supreme Court held that nondangerous individuals cannot
be civilly committed based solely on a mental illness diagnosis.32 In
order to civilly commit an individual, a state must prove by clear
and convincing evidence33 that an individual is mentally ill and a
danger to himself or others.34 The Court later looked to these
precedents when determining whether various state SVP statutes
were constitutional.35
B. Constitutional Challenges to State SVP Statutes
The United States Supreme Court first affirmed the constitution-
ality of a state SVP civil commitment law in 1997 in Kansas v.
Hendricks.36 A jury found that Leroy Hendricks met the definition
of a sexually violent predator under Kansas’s Sexually Violent
28. See id. at 14.
29. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:1 (2020) (allowing for the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators because “existing involuntary commitment procedures for the
treatment and care of mentally ill persons are inadequate to address the risk [SVPs] pose to
society”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25(c) (West 2020) (stating that sex offenders “pose a
danger to others should they be returned to society”).
30. See infra Part I.B-C.
31. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 565-66, 566 n.2 (1975).
32. Id. at 575.
33. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 427, 433 (1979) (opining that the burden of
proof must be greater than the preponderance of evidence standard because “the function of
legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions” and the “[l]oss of liberty calls for
a showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by
idiosyncratic behavior”).
34. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992) (reiterating the Addington
standard); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 358-59 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-59 (1997).
36. Id. at 371.
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Predator Act of 1994,37 and the trial court subsequently ordered his
civil commitment.38 Hendricks appealed, and the case was sent to
the Supreme Court of Kansas.39 Hendricks alleged, among other
things, that the Kansas SVP Act (1) did not satisfy substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) violated the
Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.40 The Kansas Supreme
Court invalidated the Act, reasoning that the prerequisite finding
of a mental abnormality violated substantive due process.41
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act’s
definition of a mental abnormality satisfied substantive due process
requirements.42 The Court emphasized that the statute imposed
three requirements for a respondent to be labeled a sexually violent
predator.43 The statute required the respondents display (1) sexually
violent behavior, (2) a present mental abnormality that makes it dif-
ficult for the respondent to control his or her behavior, and (3) a
likelihood of conducting similar behavior in the future, meaning he
was considered “dangerous.”44 The Court reasoned that such a “lack
of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerous-
ness, adequately distinguishe[d]” those who should be involuntarily
committed “from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.”45 The
Court also held that because the Kansas Act was civil in nature, it
did not violate the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.46
37. Id. at 352, 355. The Act defined a sexually violent predator as “any person who has
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence.” Act of May 9, 1994, ch. 316, § 2(a), 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 1824, 1825.
38. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996). 
39. Id.
40. Id. at 133.
41. Id. at 138 (reasoning that prior cases concerning the civil commitment of the mentally
ill required a finding of mental illness to satisfy substantive due process and that the Act’s
mental abnormality provision did not meet this requirement).
42. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360. The Act defined a mental abnormality as “a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person
to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others.” § 2(b), 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws at 1825.
43. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58.
44. Id. at 358.
45. Id. at 360.
46. Concluding that the Act was civil in nature, the Court reasoned that involuntary
confinement was not punitive and that the State’s intent was to provide treatment. Id. at 363,
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The Supreme Court decided Hendricks while an as-applied chal-
lenge to a similar SVP statute was pending on appeal.47 The
respondent in that case challenged the Washington Community
Protection Act of 1990 and similarly argued that the law as applied
violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses.48 The
Ninth Circuit held that a facially valid civil commitment statute can
be deemed punitive as applied so long as the actual confinement
conditions provide clear proof that the statutory scheme is punitive
in effect.49 Because the Washington Supreme Court determined that
the Act was civil in a separate suit,50 the U.S. Supreme Court
reasoned that the Act could not “be deemed punitive ‘as applied’ to
a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post
Facto Clauses.”51
In 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kansas v. Crane
to clarify the requirements Hendricks imposed on SVP civil
commitment statutes.52 A trial court had committed Michael Crane
as a sexually violent predator under the same Kansas statute at
issue in Hendricks.53 Crane appealed to the Supreme Court of
Kansas, arguing that the trial court failed to satisfy Hendricks’s
requirement that it find Crane unable to control his dangerous
behavior before subjecting him to civil commitment.54 The Kansas
Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court’s civil commit-
ment order.55
On review, the United States Supreme Court held that the Act
did not require the State to prove a respondent’s “total or complete
366, 369.
47. Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Seling v. Young,
531 U.S. 250 (2001).
48. Id. at 872-73.
49. Id. at 874. The case was remanded to the district court to determine if the conditions
were in fact punitive in effect. Id. at 877.
50. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1018 (Wash. 1993).
51. Seling, 531 U.S. at 267. Additionally, Hendricks “expressly disapproved” of evaluating
whether an Act was civil in nature by referencing the Act’s effect on one individual. Id. at 262
(citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)). The Court further opined that an “as-
applied” analysis would be an “unworkable” standard. Id. at 263.
52. 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
53. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan. 2000).
54. Id. at 287.
55. Id. at 290, 294.
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lack of control” over his or her dangerous behavior.56 However, the
Court nonetheless held that to satisfy federal constitutional re-
quirements, the state must at least show that a respondent has
“serious” difficulty controlling his or her behavior.57 The Court found
this volitional element essential for the civil commitment of sexual-
ly violent predators because it distinguishes those offenders “from
the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case” not subject to additional confinement upon release.58
The constitutionality of SVP civil commitment laws has remained
relatively undisturbed since Crane.
C. The Federal Statute and Recent Challenges
Though the United States Supreme Court upheld various state
SVP civil commitment statutes it reviewed in 1997 and 2002,
Congress did not promulgate its own SVP statute until 2006, when
it enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.59 The
Act provides a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate sex of-
fenders released from federal confinement.60 Section 302 of the Act
allows for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal
prisoners.61 In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress’s authority to enact the Act under the Necessary and
Proper Clause.62
A more recent challenge to the constitutionality of SVP statutes
occurred in 2015.63 In Karsjens v. Jesson, the plaintiffs, a class of
56. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
57. Id. at 412-13. The Court reasoned that the lack of control requirement need not be
“absolute,” as that would be an “unworkable” standard. Id. at 411.
58. Id. at 413 (first citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997); and then
citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992)).
59. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 § 302, 18 U.S.C. § 4248; CHARLES
DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22646, ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT: A
SKETCH 3 (2007).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247. Unlike state SVP civil commitment laws, the federal statute
requires “serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released” instead of a likelihood to commit sex offenses. Compare id. § 4247(a)(6), with Act of
May 9, 1994, ch. 316, § 2(a), 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 1824, 1825.
61. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act § 302.
62. 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010). 
63. See Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1143 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom.
Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
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over seven hundred individuals civilly committed under the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program, challenged the constitutionality
of the program’s governing statutes both as written and as applied.64
The district court applied strict scrutiny when conducting a sub-
stantive due process analysis, reasoning that civil commitment
significantly infringed on the plaintiffs’ liberty.65 By looking to
ample findings of fact regarding the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program,66 the court found the statutory scheme unconstitutional
because it was “not narrowly tailored” to provide treatment and had
a primarily “punitive effect.”67 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit clar-
ified that rational basis was instead the proper level of scrutiny.68
In its analysis, the court held that Minnesota’s statutory scheme
was rationally related to the State’s interest in protecting the public
from sexually dangerous persons.69 Although courts have repeatedly
held that SVP civil commitment laws satisfy substantive due
process, the scope of respondents’ procedural due process protections
remains largely unsettled.
II. CURRENT PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN SVP CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the federal and
state governments from depriving a person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without using adequate procedures.70 At a minimum, proce-
dural due process requires notice,71 an opportunity to be heard72 “at
64. Id. at 1143, 1145.
65. Id. at 1166-67.
66. See id. at 1145-64. The court highlighted the fact that not a single respondent had
been released from two facilities since the program began in 1994. Id. at 1144.
67. Id. at 1173. “One reason why we must be so careful about civil commitment is that it
can be used by the state to segregate undesirables from society by labeling them with a
mental abnormality or personality disorder.” Id. at 1143.
68. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 407-08 (8th Cir. 2017) (stating that the Supreme
Court “has never declared that persons who pose a significant danger to themselves or others
possess a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from physical restraint”).
69. Id. at 409-10.
70. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 557 (4th ed. 2011). 
71. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
72. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914)).
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a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,”73 and a decision by
a neutral decision maker.74 Procedural due process is a flexible
concept, and the necessary protections vary by context.75 When
there has been a deprivation of liberty and due process is required,
courts use the Mathews balancing test to decide the proper proce-
dural safeguards.76 Sufficient procedural protections are necessary
to ensure accurate fact-finding and provide fair process when
significant decisions are made.77
The Supreme Court has held that civil commitment raises due
process concerns because of the “significant deprivation of liberty”
it entails.78 Although respondents subject to civil commitment
proceedings do not enjoy the same rights as those subject to criminal
proceedings, states have statutorily or judicially provided many of
the same procedural protections criminal defendants receive.79
A. Overview of the SVP Civil Commitment Proceeding
Wide variation exists among the twenty state SVP civil commit-
ment statutes.80 Generally, the process begins when a state attorney
sees that a prisoner will soon be released from custody and then
files a petition to refer the prisoner to civil commitment.81 After a
73. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
74. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
579 (1973).
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”).
76. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); see also Mathews Test, CONG.GOV:
CONST.ANNOTATED, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5_4_4_3_2_1/ [https://
perma.cc/ML7F-5XSK].
77. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
78. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (“[C]ivil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”).
79. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830, 836 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[A]lthough
involuntary civil commitment proceedings under the SVPA are distinct from criminal
proceedings, [courts] look to the standards and precedents established in the analogous
criminal context for guidance.”).
80. See WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY
VIOLENT PREDATORS: COMPARING STATE LAWS (2005), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/reportfile/
899/wsipp_involuntary-commitment-of-sexually-violent-predators-comparing-state-laws_full-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8NE-DCNP]. Of interest, Pennsylvania’s civil commitment law
of sexually violent predators applies only to minors. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6401 (2020).
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.9125 (2016).
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petition is filed, most states require a hearing to determine if there
is probable cause to find that the respondent (the prisoner in ques-
tion) is a sexually violent predator.82 If the court concludes that
probable cause exists, a trial is held to determine whether the
respondent is in fact a sexually violent predator.83 The respondent
is entitled to notice of the probable cause hearing and the trial and
a right to be present at both.84
If the fact-finder concludes that the respondent is a sexually
violent predator, the respondent is transferred to a treatment
facility and is likely to spend the remainder of his or her life in
confinement.85 The respondent may periodically (most commonly
once each year) petition for release.86 To be granted release, the
respondent must show a change of circumstances demonstrating
that he or she is no longer a danger to the community.87
B. Respondents’ Rights at Trial
Because these commitment proceedings are civil in nature,
respondents are not constitutionally entitled to the same rights as
criminal defendants—including the right to counsel.88 Despite this,
all twenty states and the federal government provide indigent
respondents the right to counsel in SVP proceedings.89 Prior to the
statutory enactment of the right to counsel, state courts looked to
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Vitek v. Jones as
support for the right.90 In Vitek, the appellee, a prisoner, alleged
that his transfer to a mental institution violated procedural due
82. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-906 (2012).
83. See, e.g., id. § 37.2-908.
84. See, e.g., id. § 37.2-901.
85. See, e.g., id. § 37.2-909(A); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Civil Commitment for Sex
Offenders, 15 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS: VIRTUAL MENTOR 873, 874 (2013).
86. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-911(A).
87. See, e.g., id. § 37.2-909(A).
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3704(C) (2020); CAL. WELF.
&INST.CODE § 6603(a) (West 2020); 725 ILL.COMP.STAT.ANN. 207/25(c)(1) (West 2011); IOWA
CODE § 229A.6(1) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(b) (2019); In re Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc.
for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 13 So. 3d 1025, 1026, 1030 (Fla.
2009) (adopting a rule requiring judges to appoint an attorney to represent respondents in
SVP civil commitment proceedings).
90. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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process.91 The majority was split on whether due process afforded
the appellee the right to legal counsel. Four of the five Justices held
that due process entitled an indigent individual to counsel.92 Justice
Powell’s concurrence, which ultimately decided the issue, held that
due process required only “qualified and independent assistance.”93
The Kansas and Virginia state supreme courts relied on Vitek in
holding that a respondent had the right to counsel.94 After recogniz-
ing a statutory right to counsel, several state courts have subse-
quently held that a respondent must necessarily have the right to
effective counsel,95 because without the right, the representation
would be meaningless.96
Similarly, no right to a jury exists in civil commitment proceed-
ings.97 However, a majority of states have statutorily conferred this
right. Of the twenty states with SVP civil commitment statutes, all
but five allow for the respondent or state attorney to demand a trial
by jury.98 Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania
91. Id. at 484.
92. Id. at 482, 497.
93. Id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring).
94. In re Ontiberos, 287 P.3d 855, 864 (Kan. 2012); Jenkins v. Dir. of the Va. Ctr. for
Behav. Rehab., 624 S.E.2d 453, 459 (Va. 2006).
95. See, e.g., Grado v. State (In re Grado), 559 S.W.3d 888, 896 (Mo. 2018); In re Care &
Treatment of Chapman, 796 S.E.2d 843, 847 (S.C. 2017); Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 865; In re Coe,
286 P.3d 29, 33 (Wash. 2012) (en banc); Jenkins, 624 S.E.2d at 460. The Supreme Court of
Iowa adhered to the state’s concession that because the Iowa statute provided the right to
counsel, due process necessarily required the right to effective counsel. In re Crane, 704
N.W.2d 437, 438 & n.3 (Iowa 2005).
96. See, e.g., Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 863 (“[W]hen there is a right to counsel there is
necessarily a correlative right to effective counsel—regardless of whether the right derives
from a statute or the constitution.”).
97. See United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2010) (“[T]he claim to a jury trial
right in civil commitments has been rejected under not only the Due Process Clause, but also
the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.” (citation omitted)); Poole v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 710-
11 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3706 (2020); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603(a)-
(b) (West 2020); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/35(c) (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a06(d) (2019); In re Fla. Rules of Civ. Proc. for Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators, 13 So. 3d 1025, 1026 (2009). In some jurisdictions, the judge may also demand a
jury trial. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 229A.7(4) (2020). The federal SVP civil commitment statute,
18 U.S.C. § 4248, does not provide for a jury trial. See United States v. Veltman, 9 F.3d 718,
721 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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require a bench trial.99 Nebraska uniquely requires that a mental
health board conduct the hearing.100
Additionally, the burden of proof required at trial varies. The
Court’s holding in Addington v. Texas established that the state’s
burden to civilly commit an individual is the clear and convincing
evidence standard.101 States are currently split on the issue. Ten
states use the heightened criminal standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt,102 and the remaining ten states as well as the federal govern-
ment require the clear and convincing evidence standard.103
SVP civil commitment statutes provide respondents the right to
present evidence and cross-examine witnesses in their commitment
proceedings,104 but respondents do not have a Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation.105 Furthermore, the majority of state courts
have held that due process does not entitle a respondent to be
deemed incompetent to stand trial in an SVP proceeding.106
However, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal recognized a
limited right to a competency determination in SVP civil commit-
ment hearings.107 The Florida court held that a respondent has a
due process right to a competency determination “when the State
intends to present hearsay evidence of alleged facts that have
99. See MINN. STAT. § 253D.11(1) (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.33 (West 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2007); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6403(c)(5) (2019). 
100. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1208 (2006).
101. 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
102. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/35(d)(1)-
(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(5)(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a).
103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.918(4) (2014); MINN. STAT. § 253D.07(3); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 632.495(1) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1209(1). 
104. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901 (2011).
105. See, e.g., State v. Stout (In re Det. of Stout), 150 P.3d 86, 92-93 (Wash. 2007) (“[T]he
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is available only to criminal defendants. As such, the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is not available to an individual challenging an SVP
commitment.” (citations omitted)).
106. See Moore v. Superior Ct., 237 P.3d 530, 547 (Cal. 2010); State v. Cubbage (In re Det.
of Cubbage), 671 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Iowa 2003); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 381
(Mass. 2006); In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637, 656 (Tex. 2005). The supreme
courts of California and Massachusetts applied the Mathews test or a similar balancing test
when determining if a right to competency existed. See Moore, 237 P.3d at 543-44; Nieves, 846
N.E.2d at 385. The remaining courts engaged in a partial due process analysis. See, e.g.,
Fisher, 164 S.W.3d at 653-54. Iowa, as an outlier, applied a substantive due process analysis.
See Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d at 446.
107. See Branch v. State (In re Commitment of Branch), 890 So. 2d 322, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004).
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neither been admitted by way of a plea nor subjected to adversarial
testing at trial and so are subject to dispute and counterevidence.”108
Several state courts have applied the right to a speedy trial in
SVP civil commitment proceedings.109 These courts held that
excessive delay in civil commitment proceedings can violate a
respondent’s due process rights.110
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON SVP CIVIL COMMITMENT
PROCEEDINGS
Recent studies regarding respondents and juries in SVP civil
commitment proceedings raise concerns about the adequacy of the
current process respondents receive. Jurors, courts, and the general
public tend to dramatically overestimate a past offender’s risk of
reoffense.111 In fact, even the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed
to the alleged “high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offend-
ers”112 and described it as “frightening.”113 Justice Kennedy esti-
mated the rate of recidivism for sexual offenders to be as high as 80
percent.114
The public similarly believes convicted sex offenders have a high
chance of reoffending. In one study, those surveyed believed the risk
of reoffense was 74 percent on average.115 Actual recidivism rates,
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Morel v. Wilkins, 84 So. 3d 226, 246 (Fla. 2012) (assuming the respondent
was entitled to the right to a speedy trial); In re Fowler, 784 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 2010); In
re Ellison, 385 P.3d 15, 30 (Kan. 2016). The Supreme Court of Iowa found that Iowa’s sexually
violent predator statute, which required that an action for civil commitment be prosecuted
within ninety days, satisfied the right to a speedy trial. Fowler, 784 N.W.2d at 189-90, 192.
The Kansas Supreme Court applied the Barker test and determined that respondent’s due
process rights were violated by a four-year delay. Ellison, 385 P.3d at 22, 29-30 (citing Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)). 
110. See, e.g., Ellison, 385 P.3d at 22.
111. See, e.g., Marcus T. Boccaccini, Darrel B. Turner, Daniel C. Murrie, Craig E.
Henderson & Caroline Chevalier, Do Scores from Risk Measures Matter to Jurors?, 19 PSYCH.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 268 (2013).
112. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003).
113. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33-34 (2002).
114. Id. at 33 (citing NAT’L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
TO TREATING THE INCARCERATED MALE SEX OFFENDER, at xiii (1988)).
115. Jill S. Levenson, Yolanda N. Brannon, Timothy Fortney & Juanita Baker, Public
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES
& PUB. POL’Y 137, 144, 149 (2007). Questionnaires were given to 193 residents of Melbourne,
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however, are significantly lower.116 A 2019 study by the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) found that in the nine years
following release, only 7.7 percent of convicted sex offenders were
subsequently arrested for a sex crime.117 An earlier 2003 study by
the DOJ found that just 5.3 percent of sex offenders were subse-
quently arrested for a new sex crime within three years of release.118
The study further demonstrated that sex offenders were among the
least likely to be rearrested for the same crime.119
Moreover, several studies have demonstrated jury bias against
SVPs in civil commitment trials. In one study, Nicholas Scurich and
Daniel Krauss presented 199 jury-eligible citizens with the facts of
a civil commitment proceeding.120 The study varied the amount of
information presented and asked (1) whether the participant would
commit the respondent and (2) what percent likelihood the partici-
pant believed the individual would recidivate.121 Three out of four
mock jurors voted to civilly commit the respondent before any evi-
dence was presented.122 These mock jurors believed that the
respondent had a 59 percent chance of recidivating “based solely on
the fact [that] he was referred for a commitment proceeding.”123 In
other words, typical jurors display a distinct propensity to commit
an individual referred for civil commitment proceedings even before
a state has met its burden of proof.124
Furthermore, even when provided with a computed percentage
reflecting a respondent’s risk of recidivism, jurors tend to
Florida. Id.
116. See, e.g., MARIEL ALPER & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251773,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE PRISON: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP (2005-
14), at 1 (2019). The study tracked prisoners released in 2005. Id. Of the released prisoners
who were initially convicted of sexual assault or rape, 7.7 percent of them were subsequently
arrested for sexual assault or rape within nine years of release. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 5.
118. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
NCJ 198281, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 24 (2003).
119. See id. at 34.
120. Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. Krauss, The Presumption of Dangerousness in Sexually
Violent Predator Commitment Proceedings, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 91, 94 (2014).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 99.
123. Id. (“Jurors’ high estimates of recidivism coupled with their low implicit threshold for
commitment carries the implication that the majority of SVP respondents are foredoomed
once the decision to pursue commitment is made by the district attorney.”).
124. See id. at 100.
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overestimate the risk. Marcus Boccaccini and others surveyed jurors
at the end of twenty-six SVP civil commitment proceedings that took
place in Montgomery County, Texas.125 Twenty-five of the proceed-
ings resulted in the respondent’s commitment.126 One ended with a
hung jury, but the respondent was subsequently committed after a
new trial.127 At these trials, a psychologist or psychiatrist testified
as to the respondent’s estimated risk of reoffense, which was
calculated using industry-accepted actuarial risk assessment
instruments.128 These instruments, such as the Static-99 test, take
into account a number of risk factors such as the age of the respon-
dent, prior offenses, and the victim’s sex.129 The researchers found
that jurors’ perceptions of a respondent’s risk of recidivism were not
influenced by differing risk scores.130
In order to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator
under a SVP statute, jurisdictions require a finding that the
respondent is likely to reoffend.131 However, the majority of juris-
dictions do not quantify how high this risk of reoffense must be to
warrant commitment, leaving the task to judges or jurors.132 Thus,
if the fact-finder believes a 0.01 percent risk constitutes a sufficient
likelihood to reoffend, a respondent may be committed. One study
polled 153 jurors who had rendered decisions in SVP civil commit-
ment proceedings in Texas,133 one of the many states that does not
identify a specific threshold for the prerequisite “likely to reoffend”




129. See, e.g., id.; Static-99/Static-99R, STATIC-99, http://www.static99.org [https://perma.
cc/UU9J-RZJF].
130. Boccaccini et al., supra note 111, at 268.
131. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2020).
132. See, e.g., Jefferson C. Knighton, Daniel C. Murrie, Marcus T. Boccaccini & Darrel B.
Turner, How Likely Is “Likely to Reoffend” in Sex Offender Civil Commitment Trials?, 38 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 293, 297-98 (2014).
133. See id. at 298-99. The questionnaire asked, “If there was a 1% chance that an offender
would commit a new sex crime, would you say that he was likely to commit a new sex crime?”
Id. at 299. The questions subsequently asked about higher rates and participants could
answer “yes” or “no.” Id.
2092 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2075
element.134 In total, 53.6 percent of the jurors considered a 1 percent
risk of reoffense as sufficient to commit a respondent.135
Judges, on the other hand, appear to be more flexible regarding
judgment of a respondent’s risk of reoffense. One study questioned
twenty-six judges to determine what degree of risk for reoffense
justifies commitment.136 Unlike the jurors in the previous study,
only 11.5 percent of these judges would civilly commit a respondent
with a 1 percent risk of committing a violent act.137 About 73 percent
would commit a respondent with a 26 percent risk, and all of the
judges studied would commit a respondent with a 56 percent or
greater risk of recidivism.138
These empirical studies raise significant concerns as to whether
respondents currently receive adequate and fair process. SVP civil
commitment proceedings warrant heightened procedural protections
because they impose severe limitations on respondents’ liberties. As
explained below, the Mathews test provides the proper analysis for
expanding the scope of protections.
IV. THE MATHEWS TEST
The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge outlined a three-
factor balancing test to determine which procedures are required to
satisfy due process.139 In Mathews, the appellee alleged that he had
not received adequate process when his Social Security disability
benefits were terminated because he was not provided an eviden-
tiary hearing.140 To determine the required procedural protections,
the Court weighed (1) the private interest affected by government
action, (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest” and
the probable value of any additional or substitute procedural re-
quirements, and (3) the government’s interest and any burden
134. See id. at 298.
135. Id. at 300. Of the jurors, 81.7 percent considered a 15 percent chance of recidivism
sufficient, and 97.4 percent considered a 25 percent chance sufficient. Id.
136. John Monahan & Eric Silver, Judicial Decision Thresholds for Violence Risk
Management, 2 INT’L J. FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH 1, 2-3 (2003).
137. Id. at 2-4.
138. Id.
139. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1973)).
140. See id. at 323.
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imposed by additional procedural requirements.141 Upon balancing
these three factors, the Court concluded that the lack of an eviden-
tiary hearing prior to the termination did not violate procedural due
process.142
Although Mathews addressed the proper scope of procedural due
process in an administrative proceeding, the Court later held that
Mathews is the “general approach for testing challenged state
procedures under a due process claim.”143 The Court has continued
to apply the Mathews test to a variety of contexts.144
The Court’s use of the Mathews test in subsequent cases has
helped clarify the weight of each factor. As to the first factor, the
more important the Court deems the private interest at stake, the
greater the need for protection.145 Turning to the second factor, the
more likely the additional procedure will lead to accurate fact-
finding, the more likely the Court will expand procedural protec-
tions.146 As to the last factor, if the additional procedure requires
great government expense, the Court is less likely to expand pro-
cedural protections.147 These factors should not be considered based
on the specific facts a petitioner alleges but instead by looking at
how the system generally operates.148
Under the Mathews test, courts have significant discretion when
evaluating and balancing these competing interests. How a court
characterizes the private interest at stake and the risk of error
determines whether a petitioner’s challenge will succeed.149 Justice
Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, described the test as “simply an
ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent upon how the
141. Id. at 335.
142. Id. at 349.
143. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 (1979).
144. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781 (2008) (applying Mathews to
determine the scope of protections in habeas corpus proceedings); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 528-33 (2004) (applying Mathews to the detention of enemy combatants).
145. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 594.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (“[P]rocedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality
of cases, not the rare exceptions.”).
149. See supra notes 145-48.
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Court subjectively views the underlying interests at stake.”150 State
appellate courts have looked to the Mathews test for guidance when
determining the adequacy of procedural due process in SVP civil
commitment proceedings.
A. State Appellate Courts’ Mathews Analysis
In the past decade, significant litigation has ensued attempting
to discern the scope of procedural protections a respondent is
entitled to in SVP civil commitment proceedings. State appellate
courts have repeatedly held that the Mathews test is appropriate
when analyzing the adequacy of procedural due process in SVP civil
commitment proceedings.151
1. Characterizing the Private Interest
To begin the analysis, courts first characterize the private in-
terest at stake. Many state appellate courts characterize the private
interest in civil commitment proceedings as the respondent’s
potential loss of liberty.152 The Iowa Supreme Court asserted that
the respondent “has a private interest in his own personal
liberty,”153 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated
that, if confined, a respondent’s “loss of liberty would be total.”154
These courts further emphasized that commitment under SVP
statutes is for an indefinite period.155
A few courts, including the New Hampshire and California su-
preme courts, have expanded the private interest at stake to include
the stigmatization of being labeled a sexually violent predator.156
150. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
151. See, e.g., State v. Stout (In re Det. of Stout), 150 P.3d 86, 95 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)
(asserting that the Mathews balancing test “is the appropriate test to use in determining what
process is due in a given context, particularly where civil commitments are concerned”). 
152. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 330 P.3d 774, 779 (Wash. 2014) (en banc).
153. In re Anderson, 895 N.W.2d 131, 149 (Iowa 2017).
154. Commonwealth v. Nieves, 846 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Mass. 2006).
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See, e.g., People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1067 (Cal. 2001); State v. Ploof, 34 A.3d 563,
571 (N.H. 2011) (describing the private interest as the “loss of liberty and social
stigmatization” (quoting In re Richard A., 771 A.2d 572, 576 (2001))).
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The California Supreme Court also included a respondent’s bodily
autonomy interest because the respondent will be subject to
unwanted medical treatment if confined.157 These state appellate
courts place great weight on a respondent’s liberty interest.158 The
Washington Supreme Court opined that “[t]he first ... factor weighs
in [respondent’s] favor” and that a respondent “has a significant
interest in his physical liberty.”159 Courts have emphasized that
although the proceeding is classified as civil, this classification does
not lessen the importance of the interest.160
2. The Risk of Error
Under the Mathews test’s second prong, state appellate courts
analyze the potential for erroneous commitment under current SVP
statutes. Courts have taken two distinct approaches when analyzing
the risk of error.
Courts that refrain from expanding procedural protections ana-
lyze the risk of error under the state’s current statutory procedure.
These courts point to other procedural safeguards present in their
respective state’s civil commitment statutes—such as the right to
counsel, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right
to a jury (if provided)—to conclude that the risk of error is
minimal.161 Courts often recite a lengthy list of statutorily enacted
protections before concluding that no substantial risk of error
157. Otto, 26 P.3d at 1067 (describing the private interests as “the significant limitations
on [respondent’s] liberty, the stigma of being classified as a sexually violent predator, and
subjection to unwanted treatment”).
158. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 187 P.3d 1018, 1033 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]he first factor weighs
heavily in favor of providing all reasonable procedures to prevent the erroneous deprivation
of liberty interests.”).
159. In re Morgan, 330 P.3d 774, 779 (Wash. 2014).
160. See, e.g., Allen, 187 P.3d at 1032 (“The circumstance that a commitment is civil rather
than criminal scarcely mitigates the severity of the restraint upon the [respondent’s] liberty.”
(citing Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 223-27 (1979))); Ploof, 34 A.3d at 571
(asserting that the private interests “are substantial and parallel those at risk in the criminal
context” (quoting In re Richard A., 771 A.2d at 576)). 
161. See, e.g., Ploof, 34 A.3d at 575 (detailing the procedural safeguards provided in the
New Hampshire SVP civil commitment statute); Morgan, 330 P.3d at 779 (“Robust statutory
guaranties in [the Washington statute] provide substantial protection against an erroneous
deprivation of liberty.”).
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exists.162 These courts do not adequately consider the risk of error
alleged by the respondent, as such a notion is quickly cast aside.163
This approach fails to consider that although a statutory procedure
may provide a number of protections for respondents, it may still be
deficient, thus warranting heightened protections.
In contrast, state appellate courts that have expanded procedural
protections under the Mathews test analyze the risk of error in the
absence of the proposed procedure.164 Unlike the previous approach,
these courts refrain from looking solely to the adequacy of current
statutory requirements when determining if additional process is
necessary.165 The inquiry instead considers whether the alleged
deficient procedure creates a risk of error.166 Such courts discuss the
probable value of any additional or substitute procedural require-
ments.167
Courts that use the second approach acknowledge that current
SVP statutes provide significant procedural protections. They use
such protections as evidence to support the first Mathews fac-
tor—the respondent’s interest in the proceeding, as opposed to
minimizing the second.168 The Supreme Court of Kansas held that
“the various protections and provisions benefiting a person subject
to these proceedings that are provided by the [statute] certainly
imply that the legislature perceived a person’s substantial stake in
the process and its outcomes.”169
162. See, e.g., Ploof, 34 A.3d at 575.
163. See, e.g., id.
164. Allen, 187 P.3d at 1033 (“[W]e consider the risk, in the absence of a right to testify, of
an erroneous finding that the [respondent] is a sexually violent predator and the probable
value, in reducing this risk, of allowing him or her to testify over the objection of counsel.”);
In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1011 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“Absent an opportunity to appear and
respond to the petition for commitment, we believe that the risk of wrongful detention is too
great.”).
165. The Washington Supreme Court did not address the already-present procedural
safeguards when determining whether additional process should be provided. Young, 857 P.2d
at 1010-12. 
166. See Allen, 187 P.3d at 1011.
167. See, e.g., Young, 857 P.2d at 1011.
168. See, e.g., In re Ontiberos, 287 P.3d 855, 865 (Kan. 2012).
169. Id.
2021] JURY BIAS AND THE MATHEWS TEST 2097
3. The Government’s Interest and Burden
Under the third prong of the Mathews test, state appellate courts
have uniformly articulated the government’s interest as protecting
the public from violent sex offenders and providing treatment for
these individuals.170 Courts expanding procedural protections have
held that the government’s interest in confining violent sex of-
fenders is furthered by providing procedural protections that ensure
reliable outcomes at trial.171 In other words, the government has an
interest in confining only those individuals who actually pose a
threat to others.172 Additionally, when considering the financial and
administrative burdens of additional procedures, courts expanding
procedural protections argue that the first and the second Mathews
factors outweigh any additional cost.173 These courts therefore seek
to minimize any additional administrative costs.
V. EXPANDING PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN SVP CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
As previously detailed, jurors do not act as neutral decision
makers in SVP civil commitment trials.174 As a result, current
procedures must be expanded to ensure that respondents’ signifi-
cant liberty interests are adequately protected. This Part proposes
an application of Mathews that more robustly protects procedural
due process in SVP civil commitment proceedings and offers two
additional protections for respondents.
A. Characterizing the Private Interest
In future litigation over the adequacy of process in SVP civil
commitment proceedings, the private interests at issue should be
framed as (1) the respondent’s physical liberty, (2) the potential
170. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 330 P.3d 774, 780 (Wash. 2014) (en banc).
171. See, e.g., Allen, 187 P.3d at 1035 (“[T]he recognition of a right to testify over the
objection of counsel may serve the government’s interest in securing an accurate factual
determination concerning the defendant’s status as a sexually violent predator.”).
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., id.
174. See supra Part III.
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stigmatization resulting from the classification as an SVP, and (3)
the respondent’s autonomy interest opposing forced treatment.
The liberty interest at stake in SVP civil commitment proceedings
is enormous. Ample findings repeatedly demonstrate that most
respondents are confined for the remainder of their lives.175 In
essence, civil confinement under current SVP laws operates as a life
sentence.176 Although the proceeding is civil in nature, this classifi-
cation does not detract from the respondent’s loss of liberty.177
Accordingly, a respondent’s liberty interest closely mirrors that of
a criminal defendant.
If a respondent is committed to a treatment facility, the condi-
tions and restrictions are similar to that of incarceration. As with
imprisonment, an individual is unable to leave the premises, the
premises is under high security, and the individual is confined in
close quarters.178 The United States Supreme Court has even
acknowledged that civil commitment implicates a significant
deprivation of liberty.179
In order to strengthen the first Mathews factor, one should list
the respondent’s interest against stigmatization and interest in his
or her bodily autonomy. As to the stigmatization of the SVP
classification, the analysis should consider how such a label marks
the individual as immoral and fuels public animosity towards
convicted sex offenders.180 Turning to the respondent’s interest
against forced treatment, one must look to ethical principles of
autonomy that advocate respect for an individual’s choice.181 After
discussing these three private interests, one should conclude that
the private interests at stake—most notably the respondent’s liberty
interest—weigh heavily in the respondent’s favor.
175. See, e.g., Ridgeway, supra note 18.
176. See id.
177. See, e.g., Allen, 187 P.3d at 1032; State v. Ploof, 34 A.3d 563, 571 (N.H. 2011).
178. See Neyfakh, supra note 19.
179. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (“It is clear that ‘commitment for any
purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.’” (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979))).
180. See People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1067 (Cal. 2001).
181. See id.
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B. The Risk of Error
Proceeding to the second Mathews factor, the analysis should
consider the scope of existing procedural protections provided by the
current SVP statute. Such courts may discuss the statutory right to
counsel182 or, if adopted by the jurisdiction, the heightened burden
of proof in SVP proceedings.183 The existence of current procedural
protections arguably provides evidence of a respondent’s interest in
the proceeding.184 In other words, current protections acknowledge
a respondent’s significant liberty interest at stake. However, the
analysis must not end there. The analysis should further consider
the risk of error currently present in SVP commitment pro-
ceedings.185
Direct findings of error are not necessary if one can articulate the
probability of error resulting from current procedures. Although
respondents receive certain procedural protections under current
SVP laws, there exists a significant risk of error in jurisdictions
conducting jury trials.186 Specifically, jurors demonstrate a propen-
sity to conclude that a respondent is a sexually violent predator
before any evidence is presented at trial.187 These jurors reason that
a respondent is likely to recidivate because he or she has been
referred to SVP proceedings.188 Yet this belief runs counter to the
very core of the justice system—the presumption of innocence. The
state bears the burden to prove, in these commitment proceedings,
the respondent is a sexually violent predator.189 However, these
studies show that jurors are likely to commit an individual regard-
less of whether the state has established its burden of proof.190
182. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-901(2) (2011).
183. See, e.g., ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2020) (adopting the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard).
184. See In re Ontiberos, 287 P.3d 855, 865 (Kan. 2012).
185. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1011 (Wash. 1993).
186. See supra Part III.
187. Scurich & Krauss, supra note 120, at 99.
188. Id. (describing jurors’ belief that the respondent had a 59 percent chance of
recidivating because he or she was referred to commitment proceedings).
189. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2020).
190. See supra Part III.
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During these jury trials, jurors tend to rely heavily on the
underlying offense.191 Additionally, jurors’ aversion to and fear of
sex offenders likely contribute to high commitment rates.192 Such
findings raise serious concerns of whether respondents are truly
receiving a fair and impartial jury. Under the current system, jury
bias likely results in the commitment of individuals who do not
satisfy the prerequisite elements of the sexually violent predator
classification.193
Because of the respondent’s significant interests in the proceed-
ing—most notably, his or her liberty interest—it is imperative that
only those individuals who pose an imminent threat to society are
confined.194 A respondent’s 1 percent likelihood of reoffending does
not justify the severe deprivation of liberty that is indefinite
commitment.195 Jurors do not adequately weigh the risk of reoffense
against the respondent’s liberty interest.196 Accordingly, additional
procedures are warranted to ensure respondents receive a fair trial.
1. Mandatory Bench Trials
This Note proposes mandatory bench trials as an additional
procedure. This proposal would not violate constitutional require-
ments, as no right to a jury exists for civil commitment pro-
ceedings.197 Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Pennsylva-
nia already statutorily permit or mandate the use of bench trials in
SVP proceedings.198 Requiring a judge (instead of a jury) to find that
191. 2 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY,
JOSEPH SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229 n.19 (2019-
2020 ed.) (“We suspect that, in fact, only one criterion is doing all the work in these cases, and
that is prior conviction of sexual offense. If so, this raises substantial constitutional
concerns.”).
192. See Levenson et al., supra note 115, at 139, 155.
193. See supra Part III.
194. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Knighton et al., supra note 132, at 301.
196. See id.
197. See United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2010) (first citing United States
v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1990); then citing Hernandez-Carrera v. Carlson,
547 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008); and then citing Poole v. Goodno, 335 F.3d 705, 710-11
(8th Cir. 2003)).
198. See MINN.STAT. § 253D.11(1) (2019); N.J.STAT.ANN. § 30:4-27.33(a) (West 2020); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2019); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6403(c)(5) (2019).
2021] JURY BIAS AND THE MATHEWS TEST 2101
a respondent is a sexually violent predator would reduce the rate of
erroneous commitments. As previously mentioned, empirical
research shows that judges are better able to identify when a
respondent’s particular risk of recidivism actually warrants commit-
ment.199 Although jurors exhibit significant prejudice against
respondents in commitment proceedings, judges appear to exhibit
a greater degree of impartiality.200
A significantly lower percentage of judges, as compared to jurors,
would commit a respondent with a 1 percent chance of recidivism.201
Thus, judges appear to more adequately weigh what risk of
recidivism warrants depriving a respondent of his or her physical
freedom. Additionally, because a judge will preside over numerous
SVP proceedings and hear experts testify to differing Static-99
scores, judges can better assess what scores warrant commitment.
But because respondents currently enjoy a statutory right to a
jury trial in most jurisdictions,202 this Note offers a second procedure
to ensure respondents maintain this right.
2. Respondent’s Unilateral Right to Request—or Waive—
a Jury Trial
The second procedure would provide the respondent a unilateral
right to request a jury trial. Currently, ten states permit the State,
the respondent, or the judge to request a jury trial.203 Four states
permit the State or the respondent to request a jury trial.204 This
proposal maintains the respondent’s right to elect a jury trial if the
respondent believes a jury trial would be in his or her best interest.
Nonetheless, courts should also allow respondents to waive their
right to a jury trial if they so wish. As the Ohio Supreme Court
noted, if a respondent deems a jury trial to be “a burden, a hardship,
a prejudice to a fair trial, why in the name of reason should he not
be permitted to waive it?”205 Subjecting respondents to jury trials
199. See Monahan & Silver, supra note 136, at 4.
200. See id.
201. Compare id., with Knighton et al., supra note 132, at 300.
202. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3706 (2020).
203. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050(3) (2012).
204. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3706.
205. Hoffman v. State, 120 N.E. 234, 236 (Ohio 1918).
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against their wishes is significantly troubling.206 The government’s
insistence on a trial by jury would deprive the respondent of an
impartial fact-finder because of the inherent bias in the current jury
trial system.207 And, as mentioned above, conducting SVP commit-
ment proceedings by bench trials would likely reduce the risk of
erroneous commitment.208
C. The Government’s Interest and Burden
Addressing the third Mathews factor, one must concede that the
government has an interest in public safety and in treating
dangerous individuals.209 However, one must also emphasize that
the government has an interest in committing only those individu-
als who truly are, in fact, a danger to society. By framing the
proposed protection as aiding the truth-finding process, the pro-
posed procedure will reduce the rate of erroneous commitment.
As mentioned above, the two alternate procedures pro-
posed—mandated bench trials and providing the respondent the
unilateral right to a jury trial—ensure an accurate proceeding.210
Thus, the procedures further the government’s interest by confining
only those individuals who actually pose a threat to the community.
This leaves the government with solely an interest in limiting
economic expenses.
Addressing the financial and administrative burden that these
proposals impose on the government, it should be noted that the
additional cost of the proposed procedures is likely minimal.
Conducting SVP proceedings by bench trial would not pose a sub-
stantial financial or administrative burden on the government. To
the contrary, the procedure is likely cost-effective. Jury trials are
typically longer proceedings, and states regularly compensate jurors
for their time in court.211 Substituting jury trials with bench trials
206. See id.
207. See supra Part III (describing jurors’ propensity to convict respondents in SVP civil
commitment proceedings).
208. See supra Part V.B.1.
209. See In re Morgan, 330 P.3d 774, 780 (Wash. 2014) (en banc).
210. See supra Part V.B.
211. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-618 (1998) (compensating jurors thirty dollars a day
for appearing in court).
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would thus decrease costs. Regarding administration, judges are
already present during jury trials for the commitment of sexually
violent predators, so this would not increase judges’ dockets.212
Even if the proposed procedures do generate additional costs,
because a respondent’s liberty interest is of such great significance
and the risk of error is high, the first two factors outweigh any
additional cost.213 Therefore, additional administrative costs are
warranted to ensure the respondent is given fair process.
VI. LIKELY COUNTERARGUMENTS
This Note has proposed two solutions to address jury bias in SVP
civil commitment proceedings, but there are pertinent counterargu-
ments. Those in favor of maintaining jury trials in SVP proceedings
argue that jurors are better equipped to determine what degree of
potential harm justifies confining an individual.214 Specifically,
because jurors reflect community values, their proponents argue
that they are the proper arbiters of SVP civil commitment proceed-
ings.215
However, as detailed above, jurors’ animosity toward sex of-
fenders prohibits them from forming an impartial decision.216
Further, judges are able to reflect community values when deter-
mining if a respondent’s risk of reoffense warrants commitment
while remaining an impartial decision maker.217 Additionally, judges
are not insulated from public opinion; judicial retention elections218
212. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3706 (2020).
213. See People v. Allen, 187 P.3d 1018, 1035 (Cal. 2008) (recognizing respondents’ right
to testify at SVP civil commitment proceedings because the importance of a reliable outcome
at trial outweighs any fiscal or administrative concerns).
214. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (“[T]he jury serves the critical
function of introducing into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in the
community, concerning the kinds of potential harm that justify the State in confining a person
for compulsory treatment.”).
215. See id.
216. See supra Part III.
217. See Monahan & Silver, supra note 136, at 4 (observing that judges recognized when
individuals might be a danger to others and were willing to civilly commit them for that
reason).
218. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence
and Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 228 (2012).
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and potential media coverage219 may encourage judges to act in
accordance with public opinion. Thus, judges are able to reflect
community values in SVP commitment proceedings while, at the
same time, adequately weighing a respondent’s liberty interest
against the community’s interest in public safety.
Additionally, some could argue that current voir dire practices are
sufficient to identify bias among potential jurors. However, signifi-
cant literature on juror research demonstrates that jurors are
hesitant to disclose their true beliefs during voir dire.220 Further
complicating matters, individuals have difficulty detecting their own
implicit biases.221 Thus, current voir dire practices do not adequately
account for jury bias.
This Note acknowledges the sensitivity concerning convicted sex
offenders. Some may argue that procedural protections should not
be expanded for sex offenders because they are an undeserving
class. However, the United States Supreme Court has emphatically
stated that “[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitu-
tionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.”222
Although respondents’ underlying crimes are reprehensible, civil
commitment constitutes a severe deprivation of liberty that
warrants adequate procedural protections.223 These respondents
have successfully served their prison sentences, and civil commit-
ment should not be used as a means of punishment.
219. Claire S.H. Lim, James M. Snyder, Jr. & David Strömberg, Measuring Media Influence
on U.S. State Courts 26 (Soc’y for Econ. Dynamics, Meeting Paper No. 1193, 2010), https://
economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2010/paper_1193.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERG9-8XXD]
(finding that media coverage affects how elected state trial court judges sentence defendants
in cases involving serious violent crimes).
220. See, e.g., BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN & EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE 39 (2017)
(describing how “a fair number of prospective jurors conceal or distort their true beliefs”).
221. Id. at 44.
222. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (first citing Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971); then citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971);
then citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); and then citing U.S. Dep’t of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
223. See supra Part V.A (describing respondent’s liberty interest at stake).
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CONCLUSION
 Civil commitment under SVP laws involves a severe restriction
of a respondent’s liberty, as he or she faces commitment for an
indefinite time period.224 Current procedural protections should be
expanded to help ensure that those individuals committed under
SVP laws do, in fact, pose a danger to the community. Significant
litigation has occurred in state appellate courts attempting to
decipher the proper scope of procedural protections.225 These state
appellate courts diverge in their application of the Mathews test.
This Note (1) proposes a more rights-protective application of
Mathews to expand procedural protections for respondents in SVP
civil commitment proceedings and (2) offers two additional proce-
dures to better protect due process rights. Although sex offenders
constitute an unpopular class, these individuals still deserve ade-
quate process.
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